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china and japan
an analysis of conflict
LEE

W FARNSORTH
farnsworth
1I

since the end of world war 11
II there has been a constant
serles
series of conflicts involving both large and small nations I
propose here to analyze a conflict which occurred prior to
this hoping that it lies far enough in the past to allow per
spec
tive and objectivity but not so far back that it becomes
spective
irrelevant to an understanding of current conflict obviously
we need to know more about causes of conflict if we are ever
to reduce it effectively much as a scientist must discover the
various microscopic viruses in order to successfully combat
disease therefore the basic purpose here is to bring to light
certain political hypotheses of the causes of conflict in the
search for principles or concepts that will at least indicate
under what conditions international conflict will likely occur
the analysis will be made on the basis of certain establish
ed principles of international politics the sovereignty of
nation states the problem of overlapping national interests
particularly as differentiated between vital and secondary inin
terests the manifestation of power as the major factor in
te
international conflict and the necessity to understand the law
of change
I1 have tried to show in this paper that conflict is more
than the result of a specific incident which insulted a na
serles of causes unfortunately
tion s honor it includes a series
serles of results
there is also a series
it is not exaggeration to
say that the war in the pacific the chinese civil war the
korean war and the current crisis in southeast asia are only
some of the results of the conflict under study As secretary
of defense robert mcnamara has so aptly said wars only give
us time to determine how to avoid future wars
1
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II

A survey of the traditional relations of east asia will
show that china has long been on the defensive with demands

always directed inward now paradoxically that great nation
is reversing history
china and the powers
beginning with russia in the mid seventeenth century
demands for treaties and trade were made upon china her
response was haughty and weak great britain led off the ensuing assaults in the opium war which resulted in the series
of unequal treaties which the celestial kingdom was forced to
accept these treaties were to seriously infringe upon chinese
sovereignty by forcing the opening of ports ceding territory
hong kong charging indemnities controlling tariffs establishing extraterritoriality and yielding special western enclaves and spheres of interest the more rights and privileges
given the more need of western power to protect those rights
by 1900 the germans had mining and railway concessions
in shantung the russians were building railways from siberia
Kwang tung
to manchuria the french were working mines in kwangtung
cunnan and were building a railroad towards
Kwa ngsi and yunnan
kwangsi
these provinces through china s former vassal state of indochina the british had leased weihaiwei and kowloon and
had issued a warning that the yangtze valley was her special
area of interest and the americans were preparing the first
note on the open door policy
japan and the powers
like china s japan s first modern contact with the west
resulted in a forced acceptance of an unequal treaty after
more than two centuries of isolation commodore perry s
black ships in 1854 convinced japan of the efficacy of opening up limited trade and coaling stations
whereas china had rejected western technological advances japan adopted them in conformity with the charter
oath of 1868 proclaimed by the young emperor meiji that
knowledge and learning shall be sought for throughout the
world in order to establish the foundation of the empire
japanese missions soon began to spread throughout the world
in search of new ways and techniques to strengthen the polity
of japan
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japan was soon dissatisfied with being the unequal partner
and sought revision of the treaties although the united states
was sympathetic it was only the british who could lead the
way which they did only in 1894 after being satisfied that
japan had modernized her legal codes and courts
these events were humiliating and degrading to japan she

had been bombarded by punitive squadrons missionaries had
been forced on her and her own concessions won from china
had been wrested from her only to fall into the hands of russia a few years later these conditions in japan and eventually in china
were bound to bring forth a national reaction
among a people who had so recently seen themselves as a
nation for the first time As japan s relations with china are
surveyed it will become obvious where these anxieties thus
produced were to be directed

china and japan
in 1871 japan became the first asian power to enter into
a treaty with china the treaty of peace and amity gave japan
commercial rights in part similar to those enjoyed by westerners japan was not only no longer a vassal to the middle
kingdom she even obtained a greatly modified form of extra
traterritoriality
territoriality although she failed to obtain the usual for
western nations most favored nation clause japan was on
her way to demonstrating her equality albeit at the expense
of china
in the next three decades japan intensified this drive for
equality in 1874 a punitive mission was sent to formosa beOkin awan sailors by aboriokinawan
cause of the murder of several okinagan
gines this mission not only challenged china s sovereign
claim on formosa but also asserted japan s protective sovereignty over okinawa and the ryukyus previously considered as
under the suzerainty of china in 1876 japan recognized another chinese vassal state korea as an independent state with
the same sovereign rights as those of japan
in the 1880 s japan imposed western style indemnities
on korea for japanese deaths in that country in 1894 one
week after the signing of the equality treaty with great britain
japanese seized the royal palace in seoul and overthrew the
government of the king the result was war with china
the treaty of shimonoseki was signed april 17 1895 and
included indemnities and land concessions
concessions although a tri
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partite intervention of russia germany and france forced
japan to return the Liao
tung peninsula to china only to be
liaotung
taken by russia in 1898 japan had manifest her equality
with the west by humiliating the giant of asia
ly twentieth
early
eaily
china in the eally
eai
eal
the patterns established

centum
centuryy
centui
in the nineteenth century con-

tinued into the twentieth the treaty powers having carved
china into their respective spheres of interest now sought
to stabilize the status quo by proclaiming through the united
states that china s territorial and administrative integrity must
be protected and declared the open door to be the guiding
principle for equal and impartial trade with all parts of the

chinese empire
the japanese were not satisfied with the status quo however and after joining in a treaty of alliance with the mighty
great britain in 1902 proceeded to attack and defeat russia
in 1904 obtaining her spheres of interest in north china
manchuria and north korea furthermore japan having annexed korea in 1910 now saw herself not only as equal with
the west in china but as having a preeminent
pre eminent interest the
japanese political scientist masamichi royama wrote that although japan cooperated generally with the western powers
it was nevertheless tacitly understood by the majority of the
japanese people that she had special relations with the asiatic
continent upon which she depended for her economic security
and future prosperity no matter what policies the western
powers might pursue
japan s vital interests on the mainland for relief of
population pressures obtaining raw materials and satisfying a
growing power drive reached its first peak in the twenty
one demands of january 18 1915 had china accepted these
demands in roto
toto
two it would have meant the yielding of sovereignty to japan As it was china agreed wholly to nine of
the demands partially to five and rejected seven this particularly strengthened japan s influence and control of northeast china and manchuria
A contemporary japanese apologist pointed out that japan s
sphere of interest was minute compared to others he argued
that the lessons of imperialism were learned from the west
11

apan
masamichi
Royania foreign policy of japan
masainkhi royama
daan
council institute of pacific affairs 1941 p 60
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remember that it was not japan that originated the
idea of sphere of interest it was because european powers
were bent upon dividing china into so many spheres of inin
fluence that japan was obliged to step in and take such
measures as might be necessary to safeguard her position in
the far east that might arise from the unhappy condition of
china

kawakami was especially biting towards the protests from
the united states and the american people

the

trouble with the average american is that he permits the nonessential
non essential details of japan s recent diplomatic
negotiations with china to obscure the main
maln point upon
which japan s policy hinges that point is her desire to become the dominant factor in the molding of china s destiny
call it an asiatic super monroe doctrine if you will the
name is immaterial the important thing is that japan the
only asiatic nation efficient enough to escape the yoke of european domination is aspiring to the leadership of other
asiatic nations to me this is a laudable ambition with
which america whose traditional policy has been to keep
europe at arm s length must sympathize once this point is
frankly conceded even the apparently obnoxious group V
of the japanese demands is easily understood

though there were protests from the west

in response to

cries for relief from the chinese government none were more
than moralistic utterances america s open door policy aply was the same because acting secretary of state lansparently
parent
ing informed the american legation in peking in 1914 that it
would be quixotic in the extreme to allow the question of
china s territorial integrity to entangle the united states in

international difficulties
in the 1920 s the japanese yielded most of the privileges
thus won back to china in return for international recognition
as a world power included in the various treaties signed by
japan and the west were guarantees of china s sovereignty
similar to those of the earlier open door notes japan also
joined in signing the ill fated pact of paris which renounced
war as an instrument of policy in this case however japan
4

K
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took special note that manchuria was within its sphere of defense and was still a vital interest
rhe pest
the
west
asia and me
vest
weft in the twentieth century
although the early twentieth century seemed to be moving

from a state of tension to a period of calm there were unseen but dangerous currents which more than offset the possibility that the utopian hopes of the decade of treaties would
reach fruition chief among these was the reaction of the
western nations notably that of the land of freedom and
als
equality the united states to the immigration of orientale
orientals
Orient
beginning with the chinese exclusion acts continuing
through the head tax on chinese in california declared unconstitutional and the sharp limitations of japanese by washington and california legislatures and culminating in the
1924 exclusion acts the policies were ill designed to promote
international conciliation A japanese scholar later noted that
japan had accepted its responsibilities in the washington
treaties while the united states responded with the exclusion
acts no act on the part of a foreign power could have
given a stronger argument to japanese conservatives for contin
ental expansion
tinental
these same treaties were used later by
the militarisms
militarists as proof of the inability of civilian government
to exercise sound judgment in protecting japan s vital interests
As if a portent of the future despite the fact japan was
now showing greater respect for the growing independence
of china the failure of the japanese government to send
troops to defend her citizens at nanking during an uprising
there in 1927 led to the collapse of the general baron tanaka
cabinet even though no foreigners including japanese were
injured at that time the successor government did not fare
much better although it did carry out a more positive policy
warlord
war lord chang tso
towards china in 1928 the manchurian garlord
lin who was considered to be a puppet for japanese ambitions bolted to the nationalist chinese when he failed to
receive japanese aid in expeditions against the nationalists
whereupon the japanese young officers in manchuria plotted chang tso lin s death hoping his son chang hsueh liang
would be more amenable to control he was not A crisis re
royama p 55
ra tsuli
tsuji takeuchi
fatsuji
tatsuji
asid
asiu
avid june 198
1938 p 186
arid
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suited in ksinan
tsinan in north china and on april 19 1928 japanese troops landed there to protect japanese property and residents and to keep chiang kai shek from the void of power
which would be detrimental to japan s interests there
the
liberals in japan were incensed that the japanese were risking
a fight against the chinese nationalist army for the sake of
some remote apprehension about her future position in manchuria 8 with the withdrawal of the troops on may 2 1929 it
was only a short time before the government fell again under
conservative pressure
the new chinese government further alienated the japanese with a new tariff schedule which imposed heavy duties on
japanese goods under these circumstances reported takeuchi liberal elements found it extremely difficult to convince
the people whose lot was becoming progressively worse that
continuation of a liberal policy would be beneficial to the
country 9 the world depression made japan s chinese investments even more vital to her economic survival by 1931
her investments in china were second only to those of great
britain but by percentage there was no comparison as a percentage of total overseas investments british investments in
china were 59
5.9 percent whereas those of japan represented
59
10
819
percent
81.9
819
7

ill
lii
japan as a participant in conflict
the strict japanese hierarchical relationships were such
that they could cause the nation to succumb to conflict caused
by a few well placed leaders there is a proper station for each
person in the society and respecting that condition is what
brings social tranquility this requires a high degree of discipline and loyalty particularly in relation to the emperor who
had become the focal point of all loyalty ruth benedict in
her classical study of japanese culture pointed out how the
hierarchical system was transferred to international relations
by the japanese government s practice of introducing international notes with the idea that the basic aim of her policy was
royama
Ro
yanta
yania p

4
43

ibid

takeuchi

p

188

ibid
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to enable each nation to find its proper place in the world 11
in the hierarchy china had strangely enough become the
backward young brother who needed assistance in finding his

proper station
we have already seen that economically japan s need for
sources of raw materials for industry and markets for finished
goods made the loss of these sources dangerous for her economic survival takeuchi says that the high tariffs of the west
41.5 in the united
33.3
53.3
555
535
355
353
415
333
533 in free trade great britain and 415
states gave rise to a new feeling of desperation among
japanese in their struggle for civilized existence herein lies
the basic cause for japan s expansionist tendency 111212
within japan a number of patriotic societies such as the
amur river society erroneously called the black dragon
society
whose name indicates the demand to extend japanese influence into north china came into being the fanaticism of these societies increased to such an extent that it led in
november 1930 to the shooting of a prime minister he died
eight months later on may 15 1932 another prime minister
was assassinated bringing to an end the few and futile years
of party government in 1936 more assassinations were carried
out and the criminals became national heroes because their
acts were intended solely to protest the place of japan and its
emperor
A final factor in japan s warmaking
war making potential was her
wadmaking
image of china the official image of china as depicted by
the chief delegate to the league of nations was that although japan had in 1922 envisioned a peaceful and unified
china the china of 1932 was one of disunion and anarchy with the militarist struggles threatening the core of
has deeply enchina itself communism he declared
trenched itself in the heart of the country and the habit of
As for the
civil strife has become engrained and endemic
people they are misled much terrorized and much misrepresented and their main desire is to enjoy in peace and quiet
the results of their industry 13 the conclusion reached by the
ton

ruth benedict the chrysanthemum and the sword new york hough
mifflin co 1946 p 44 this is an excerpt from the note to the united

states of december 7 1941
ap 184
rake uchi pp
takeuchi
85
18485
japan delegation to the league of nations
geneva 1953
pp
ap 12
13
1933
1955
1213
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japanese was that china was badly in need of an elder brother
to help straighten out her internal confusion

china as a participant in conflict
the conditions in china though more unsettled were not
quite as complex as those in japan it is certain however that
levels of tension capable of producing external conflict were
present albeit in a rather negative sense
after centuries of a stereotyped form of confucianism
with its ancient and rigid patterns of social relationships
china was in a woeful condition of upheaval following the
coming of the west the adjustments from archaic ideas to
a modern view of the world and practical education was slow
and painful with the fall of the last dynasty in 1911 control
of the country degenerated into two rival governments and
war lords the people were noc
nor
numerous areas controlled by warlords
sure of any authority except that of the family and the various
movements toward national unity received little grassroots

support
in spite of the efforts of sun yat sen yuan shih k ai and
chiang kai shek the plight of the peasantry in the decade
after 1915 became so wretched that a truly revolutionary
atmosphere was developing in the countryside 14 the nationalist triumph eventually brought a modicum of control and a
few reforms but it could not gain full control especially
through democratic means and was forced to establish a tutelary government the nationalist party established on communist party lines thanks to the soviet advisers to sun yat
sen became the basic decision making organ still the internal
political structure remained so corrupt and weak as to almost
invite interference
militarily the prime aim of chiang was to suppress the
communist soviet areas of china while dealing diplomatically
with japan over north china and manchuria perhaps this
was all he could do the lytton commission which investigated japan s attack on manchuria reported that the local army
in manchuria was generally independent of nanking and its
officers controlled all public offices nepotism corruption
and maladministration continued to be the unavoidable conthis state of affairs
sequences of the state of affairs
however was not peculiar to manchuria as similar or even
fred greene
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worse conditions existed in other parts of china 10 even
chiang undoubtedly in an effort to arouse his people noted in
1934 that from the standpoint of military preparedness we
are not fit to be called a modern state
furthermore he
cited cencius
mencius wisdom that a kingdom must first smite it
self and then others will smite it in warning that further
weakening of china would invite further external encroach
ment 17
As for the image of the opponent it was ambivalent on
the one hand china saw japan as a barbaric and uncivilized
upstart challenging a superior in the hierarchy of nations on
the other hand the chinese also viewed japan as a progressive
oriental nation successfully countering the western imperial
ests
ists As one chinese writer noted japan is like a man who
has made a lot of money in a short time but does not know
how to spend it yes japan has built up vast organizations
he asserts and because of this she claims the right to be con
sidered
ridered among the first rank of civilized nations but he con
eludes japan today is not civilized she is merely mechan
iced
ized

IV

the

beginning of conflict
in the spring of 1931 a captain nakamura of the japan
ese army wandered into inner mongolia from manchuria
he was dressed as a civilian and apparently carried documents
variously identifying himself as a doctor a commercial trader
and a soldier nakaamura
Naka amura managed to get himself killed in a
small village apparently over a gambling debt japan immedi
abely
ately demanded both justice and honor the chinese were slow
and evasive but finally met the demands of the japanese on
september 17 1931 19
the following night despite these actions of the chinese
the japanese military machine went into action and with a
minimum of resistance occupied the city of mukden and half
a dozen other strategic points in south manchuria a move
15

1945

japan delegation to the league of nations pp
28 29
ap 2829
david N rowe china among the powers new york harcourt brace
p

13

chiang kal
kai shek china f foreign relations nanking ministry of
foreign affairs 1935 pp
4 5
ap 45
bruno lasker and agnes roman propaganda from china and japan
new york american council institute of pacific relations 1938 p 93
american council institute of pacific relations conflict in the far
fai
fat east
new york 1932 pp
ap liff
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which even surprised the tokyo government which had been
pursuing a policy of conciliatory diplomacy faced with a
jair
tatt
fair
fait accompli however the government could do nothing exfatt
cept publicly support the move while privately struggling to
20
regain control of the destiny of japan 120
the spark that ignited the conflagration was an explosion
which cracked the fishplate at the junction of two rails on
the south manchurian railway damage so slight as not to
even slow down a train passing the spot shortly afterward 2
by january of 1932 japan had advanced to the great wall
and controlled more than half of manchuria and had attacked
shanghai as a result of anti japanese riots and boycotts there
killing thousands of chinese manchoukuo under the ex
emperor henry pu yi had been proclaimed in manchuria 2
this pattern of an attack following almost impossible demands continued through the entire period of 193137
1931 37 finally
escalating from the level of incidents to all out war

claims and demands
japan claimed at the league of nations that chaos in
china was endangering international relations japan s actions were to prevent the development of war and were
therefore in conformity with the league of nations 21 furtther more japan had a special position in china as a result
hermore
of exceptional treaty rights pluf
pius
plus
aluf the natural consequences
which flow from her close neighborhood and geographical
situation and from her historical associations although japan
still did not have a general and vexatious right of intervention it did have a position in which she must defend
herself with uncommon energy against military attack 11224 the
japanese delegation pointed out how even the lytton commission had admitted japan s vital interests in manchuria
when it reported
11

11

2

there

nowhere in the world an exact parallel
to this situation no example of a country enjoying in the
id
ib
ibid
21ibid
ibid

p

is probably

13

interestingly enough japan waited nearly a year before recognizing the
new puppet regime probably in anticipation of another nation leading the
way

japan delegation to the league of nations p 7
ibid p 30
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territory of a neighbouring
ing state such extensive economic and
neighbour
administrative privileges 25

when someone suggested that there be a measure of international control over manchuria the japanese made it clear
that this was contrary to their vital interest
in this connection let me state clearly once and for
all that the japanese people will for reasons too patent for
me to feel necessary to explain oppose any such attempt
in manchuria you can be sure of that we do not mean to
defy the world at all it is only our right 21il

japan claimed even after occupying canton that her de-

sire to establish a new order in asia was based on the
firm conviction that it and it alone will offer the real solution for the age
long problem independent strong and prosagelong
perous china 27
china for her part merely demanded that there be no
violation of her sovereignty with economic cooperation based
upon the principles of equality and reciprocity according to
chiang who was willing to acknowledge japan s natural interest in manchuria what we have been striving for incessantly is nothing more than our existence as a nation and coexistence with other countries in the family of nations
the growing attacks of japan led to a brief unification of
china to resist japan and save the country japan countered by sending more troops into north china resulting in
the chinese announcement to the world that its vital interests
were still being violated and further appeasement was at an
end chiang is quoted as follows
21

the

safety of lukouchlao
lukouchiao is a problem involving the
existence of the nation as a whole whether the incident can
be amicably settled comes within the comprehension of the
term limit of endurance
if we abandon as much as
an inch of our territory to the invaders without attempting
to defend it then we shall be guilty of an unpardonable sin
21
against our race 20

V

that part of the failure to deter conflict
was the failure of the available international machinery to

it

is recognized

ibid
261 bid
261bid
ald p 13
aid
royama p xi
27royama
ap 6688
chiang pp
19
royama p 117
25ibid

27

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol6/iss3/5

12

Farnsworth: China and Japan: An Analysis of Conflict

CHINA AND JAPAN

151

uphold its covenant to protect nations from unprovoked attack and japan warned that she would violently oppose any
attempt to do so the roots of the conflict however are found
elsewhere
national pride of japan had much to do with japan s attacks exclusion acts in both the united states and australia
led professor takeuchi to remark
you have closed all doors to our men and goods elsewhere and yet insist on the open door only in china we
have a population that is increasing at the rate of nearly one
million a year and they must be fed
rightly or wrongly the japanese people are not convinced that the world has
been fair with them
1

japan as a sovereign nation was unwilling to allow inter national interference in her desire to protect what she
ternational
viewed as her vital interests she exerted her power to do
so and not meeting resistance continued on the road to con-

quest

china also sensed that her vital interests were in jeopardy
from japan but lacking sufficient power had to appease
japan s demands who in turn exerted more power to make
the position even more secure
just as japan had announced her intent to fight for her
vital interests so china also had to fight eventually or lose
her sovereignty and nationhood clearly the vital interests
of china and japan had come into conflict and war was the
inevitable result japan knew the consequences because each
time she made a demand which violated china s vital interests
reinforcements were usually on the way all of the sugar
coated moral underpinnings of saving china and arranging
the hierarchy of nations in true perspective could not hide the
fact that japan was committing aggression
finally there was widespread neglect of the law of change
the west failed to recognize until too late how powerful
japan had become and how interdependent economically the
world had become despite depression it further failed to
realize the dangers of racial discrimination in international
relations
both japan and the west failed to recognize the changes
that were going on within china the new noises of nation
igo
gi
takeuchi ap
91
pp 190
19091
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alism
alisa and desire for international recognition so recently
heard in japan itself were ignored as if they were mere imcrumblings
rumblings
gs japan was thirty years too late as
polite stomach rumblin
far as accomplishing her ends in china were concerned
the contest was inevitable as was the eventual outcome
the conflict was a real education to the world but as is so
often the case the lessons have not been remembered international organization is still only a facade behind which the
sovereign states vie for position with their power the law
of change is consistently ignored and challenges of overlapping vital interests are everywhere upon us we wonder if another broken rail can be the cause of another conflict in a
day when the arsenals of nations contain nuclear weapons
weapons which the awakened giant so recently abused now
possesses
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